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STRICKLER v. COMMONWEALTH
241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Thomas David Strickler was convicted of robbery, abduction and
capital murder in connection with the death of Leanne Whitlock, a
coed at James Madison University. On January 5, 1990 at approxi-
mately 6:45 p.m., Whitlock was abducted after she left a friend at the
Valley Mall in Harrisonburg, Virginia. As Whitlock's blue 1986
Mercury Lynx was stopped due to traffic, Mrs. Anne Stolzfus wit-
nessed Strickler pound on the passenger window of Whitlock's car
and then force himself inside. Once inside, Strickler hit her until she
stopped sounding the car horn and stopped the car. At that moment,
Ronald Henderson and a blond woman let themselves into the back
seat of the car. Mrs. Stolzfus then approached Whitlock's car and
asked if she was O.K. Whitlock mouthed the words "help" in response
and slowly drove away.
At approximately 7:30 p.m., another witness saw a dirty blue car
turn off a local road and onto the cornfield where Whitlock's body was
later discovered. He identified the driver as Strickler. Later that night
Strickler gave Whitlock's wristwatch to a girl at Dice's Inn in
Staunton, Virginia. Strickler then left Dice's Inn with Henderson and
Donna Tudor. Once he dropped Henderson off in Harrisonburg,
Virginia, Strickler spent the next few days with Tudor. On January 10
or 11 Strickler abandoned Whitlock's car.
On January 13, 1990, the police discovered Whitlock's frozen
nude body in the field where Strickler was seen driving onto. There
the police also found Henderson's wallet, Whitlock's clothing, hair
matching Strickler's, and a sixty-nine pound rock covered with
Whitlock's blood and hair. Whitlock died from "four large, crushing,
depressed skull fractures with lacerations of the brain." Strickler v.
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 488, 404 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1991).
Whitlock's fatal injuries were caused by repeatedly pounding her
head with the rock and with such force that the frozen ground beneath
her head was left with depressions.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Strickler's conviction and
sentence of death, deciding numerous issues adversely to the claims
raised by Strickler. This summary will not discuss those claims dealt
with by the court in a summary manner, claims dealing with non-
capital issues, claims relating to jury questionnaires and voir dire,
claims the court found to be foreclosed by its prior decisions, as well
as sentence review for proportionality and for passion and prejudice.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Strickler raised three issues which merit attention. Most impor-
tant was the application of the "triggerman" rule where the court held
that a theory of joint participation was sufficient to convict a defen-
dant of capital murder. Next was what evidence is relevant to proving
the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Finally, Strickler
raised the issue of what, if anything, was required to be given to the
defense counsel by the prosecution through a motion for a bill of
particulars.
A Joint Participant can be a "Triggerman"
The "triggerman rule," Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18 (1988), states
that "except in the case of a killing for hire under the provisions of §
18.2-31 (b) an accessory before the fact or principal in the second
degree to capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and
punished as though the offense were murder in the first degree." Thus,
unless a case is one of a killing for hire, "only the actual perpetrator
of the killing may be convicted" of capital murder. Strickler, 241 Va.
at 494, 495. Strickler claimed that he was, at most, an accomplice
whereas the commonwealth claimed that both defendants "acted
jointly to accomplish the actual killing." Strickler, 241 Va. at 494.
Strickler is only the second defendant convicted under Va. Code
§ 18.2-31 (b), now Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (2) (1991), where the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld a finding of capital murder based
upon a theory ofjoint participation. Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980),
was the first capital murder conviction upheld where the petitioner
"'jointly participated in [a] fatal beating"' of the victim. Strickler, 241
Va. at 495 (quoting Coppola, 220 Va. at 256-57). In Coppola, Frank
Coppola, and another defendant, Joseph Elliott Miltier,' repeatedly
assaulted the victim, causing her death. Coppola and Miltier beat the
victim, especially about her head. Each defendant was found to be an
"immediate perpetrator," and Coppola's "conduct appears.., to have
been more violent and vicious than that of Miltier, and thus distin-
guishable." Coppola, 220 Va. at 257-58. In Strickler, the Virginia
Supreme Court codified the joint participation theory and held,
"where two or more persons take a direct participation in inflicting
fatal injuries, each joint participant is an 'immediate perpetrator' for
the purpose of the capital murder statutes." Strickler, 241 Va. at 495
(quoting Coppola, 220 Va. at 256-57).
Strickler's claim that accomplice liability was insufficient to
convict him of capital murder was based on Cheng v. Commonwealth,
240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990) and Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18
(1988), the "triggerman rule." See case summary of Cheng 1'.
Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 20 (1990).
Cheng's capital murder conviction was reversed under the "triggerman
rule" because "'[t]he evidence was insufficient ... to support the
inference that the defendant had fired the fatal shots."' Strickler, 241
Va. at 495 (quoting Cheng, 240 Va. at 43). The Virginia Supreme
Court found that "Cheng is inapposite" to Strickler's case. Id. at 495.
According to a theory of joint participation, the court held that it was
immaterial whether Strickler held Whitlock or pummeled her with the
rock because the evidence showed that Whitlock's death was caused
by one indivisible act perpetrated by two individuals.
Sufficiency of Evidence of Future Dangerousness
Strickler challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of future
dangerousness. The court held, "the evidence was more than suffi-
cient to support the jury's finding of 'future dangerousness."' Id. at
497. Presented as evidence of Stickler's future dangerousness were
eight felony convictions and twelve misdemeanor convictions. This
included convictions for petit larceny, tampering with a vending
machine, violating federal probation, receipt of a firearm while a
felon, and a federal conviction for counterfeiting money. "Most
significantly," there was additional evidence of Strickler's "violent
behavior before and during the commission of the present crime, his
boastful manner in describing it, his contemptuous references to the
victim, his threat to kill Henderson, his violent behavior when angered
by Donna Tudor," his lack of remorse, and his attempt to use the
victim's bank card. Id. Thus, the court shows that it is willing to admit
as evidence of future dangerousness all conduct of the defendant
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before, during and after the commission of a murder until the actual
trial, including anything which is debatably of a criminal nature. It is
also worth noting that Strickler challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence in the aggregate and not the relevance of the arguably non-
violent acts.
Bill of Particulars
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's denial of
Strickler's motion for a bill of particulars. The bill asked:
A. To identify the grounds, and all of them, on which [the Common-
wealth] contends that defendant is guilty of capital murder under
Virginia Code Sect. 18.2-31, as amended, 1950.
B. To identify the evidence, and all of it, upon which it intends to rely
in seeking a conviction of defendant upon the charge of capital
murder.
D. To identify the evidence, and all of it, on which it intends to rely
in support of the aggravating factors identified, and all other evidence
which it intends to introduce in support of its contention that death is
the appropriate punishment for this defendant.
241 Va. at 490. The court stated that the motion was properly denied
because:
[t]o be sufficient, an indictment must give the accused
"notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so
he can make his defense." When an indictment meets that
standard, as the indictments here do, a bill of particulars is
not required.
Id. (quoting Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d
411, 413 (1976))(citing Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 569,
138 S.E.2d 293, 296-97 (1964); Tasker v. Commonwealth, 202 Va.
1019,1024,121 S.E.2d 459,462,463 (1961)). The court also held that
anything sought by the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars
above and beyond the "'notice of the nature and character of the
offense charged"' was a discovery request which must be made
pursuant to the rules of the court. Id. See generally case summary of
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
It is important to note that part (C) of Strickler's motion for a bill
of particulars was granted by the circuit court. This is significant
because the indictment did not give the "nature and character" of the
aggravating factors that the commonwealth sought to prove and part
(C) only asked the commonwealth to identify the aggravating factors.
This motion should be granted so that the defendant can receive his
due process right to be heard and to present evidence which will allow
him to defend against evidence of aggravating factors. Defense
counsel may contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for a
new model bill of particulars and supporting memorandum. Finally,
is arguable that merely asking the commonwealth to identify the type
of evidence it will seek to introduce is not the same as discovery. In
addition, in light of the courts' willingness to allow a variety of
conduct to prove future dangerousness, motions in limine on future
dangerousness should be considered to exclude evidence which is not
probative of defendant's propensity to commit acts of violence in the
future.
Summary and analysis by:
Marcus E. Garcia
QUESINBERRY v. COMMONWEALTH
241 Va. 364,402 S.E.2d 218 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
A Virginia jury convicted George Adrian Quesinberry of capital
murder in the commission of a robbery. Virginia Code § 18.2-31 (d) (now
4). Quesinberry and two friends were in the process of robbing an office
building when they were interrupted by the owner, Thomas L. Haynes.
Quesinberry shot Haynes twice in the back as the store owner attempted
to flee. As the three thieves were leaving, Haynes tried to push himself up.
Quesinberry hit him in the head at least twice with his pistol, and Haynes
died later that morning.
Quesinberry filed a pre-trial motion for a bill of particulars request-
ing that the court direct the Commonwealth to identify: (1) the grounds,
and all of them, on which the Commonwealth contended that the defen-
dant was guilty of capital murder, (2) the evidence, and all of it, upon
which the Commonwealth intended to rely in seeking a conviction of the
defendant upon the charge of capital murder, (3) the aggravating factors,
if any, upon which the Commonwealth intended to rely in seeking the
death penalty, should the defendant be convicted of capital murder; and
(4) the evidence, and all of it, on which the Commonwealth intended to
rely in support of the aggravating factors identified, and all other evidence
which the Commonwealth intended to introduce in support of its conten-
tion that death was the appropriate punishment for this defendant. The trial
court granted the motion with respect to sections (1) and (3), but denied
the motion with respect to sections (2) and (4). Quesinberry v. Common-
wealth, 241 Va. 364,372,402 S.E.2d 218,223 (1991).
During the penalty stage, Quesinberry's attorney objected to the
introduction of evidence that the defendant possessed a stolen gun and that
the defendant was auser of marijuana and cocaine. The court admitted the
evidence over defendant's objection. Id. at 380, 402 S.E.2d 227. In
contrast, the court refused to instruct the jury that alife sentence meant that
Quesinberry would be ineligible for parole for thirty years. Id. at 371,402
S.E.2d 223. After hearing the instructions, the jury retired to deliberate
and fix punishment. The jury returned and requested definitions of several
words appearing in the instructions: "culpable," "moral turpitude," "quan-
titatively," and "qualitatively." The court gave definitions without
objection from counsel. Id. at 380,402 S.E.2d 228. Immediately after the
jury left the courtroom to resume deliberation, Quesinberry's attorney
objected to the definitions given by the court. The court overruled the
objection as untimely. The jury fixed Quesinberry's punishment at death.
Quesinberry appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, claiming, inter
alia, that the trial court erred in not ordering a bill of particulars in
accordance with paragraphs (2) and (4) of his motion; that the court erred
in admitting evidence that he had possessed stolen property and used
marijuana and cocaine; that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
as to the practical consequences of a life sentence; and that the trial court
erred in its definitions of the terms for which the jury sought clarification.
HOLDING
Quesinberry assigned numerous errors. Some of these the court
treated in a conclusory fashion. Others did not involve death penalty law
or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around facts peculiar
to the case. These issues, which will not be discussed in this summary,
include: the constitutionality of the death penalty; the constitutionality of
